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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-RIGHT

OF ACCESS

TO

CIVIL TRIALS-The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held

that the press and public alike possess a common law and first
amendment right of access to civil proceedings, which can only be
limited when an important countervailing interest is demonstrated.
Publicker Industries, Inc., v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
On December 7, 1982 a hearing was conducted before the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concerning a proxy fight to determine control over Publicker Industries, a publicly held corporation.' At issue at the hearing was a
motion by the defendant, Cohen, that an impending shareholders'
meeting be postponed until the corporation disclosed certain busi-

ness information.2 The presence of a Philadelphia Inquirer reporter prompted a request by Publicker that the hearing be
closed.' The request was granted and the hearing was ordered
closed by the district court judge on grounds of anticipated discussion of the business information which the corporation asserted
was highly sensitive and confidential.
Subsequently, attorneys for both Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
(PNI) and Dow Jones and Company, Inc., which published the Inquirer and the Wall Street Journal respectively, requested that
1. Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984). The underlying litigation involved an attempt on the part of the defendant, David Cohen, to acquire
control of the Publicker Industries board of directors at a December 8, 1982 stockholders'
meeting. In consideration for purchasing a considerable number of Publicker stock shares
owned by the Neuman family, Cohen received their irrevocable proxies to be voted at the
stockholders' meeting. Publicker filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in an effort to thwart Cohen's attempt to gain control of the
board. Id. at 1062.
2. Id. Cohen claimed that Publicker's failure to disclose this information constituted a
violation of federal securities laws. Also at issue was Publicker's motion for a preliminary
injunction requesting that the court prohibit Cohen from soliciting proxies for and voting
proxies at the December 8 meeting. Id.
3. Id. at 1063.
4. Id. at 1064-65. This confidential information concerned the failure of a foreign subsidiary of Publicker to receive authority from British government authorities to introduce a
particular enzyme into the production of the grain alcohol used in its scotch whiskey; this
approval was required by the English Company Finance Act. The use of the enzyme had
raised fears with Publicker that the scotch was produced illegally, necessitating its removal
from the world market at an irreparable financial loss. Therefore, until it could obtain the
requisite authority from the British government, Publicker desired to keep the use of the
enzyme confidential. Id.
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the proceedings be opened.' The court refused to open the hearing
to the press or public, indicating that the critical issue confronting
the court concerned the public disclosure of the confidential information.6 The court reasoned that to allow newspaper access to the
hearing, and thus probable dissemination of the confidential information, would be a usurpation of the judicial function in deciding
the case. 7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently
denied a motion for issuance of a writ of mandamus brought by
the newspapers to compel the district court to reopen the hearing.8
In deciding the merits of the proxy fight controversy, the district
court denied Cohen's motion to postpone the stockholders' meeting of December 8, 1982, declaring that as a result of the Delaware
County Common Pleas Court's action invalidating the stock
purchase agreement, Cohen had no interest in Publicker and thus
lacked standing.9 Additionally, the order denying public disclosure
of the confidential information remained in force. 10
PNI and Dow Jones then moved for immediate access to the
transcript of the December 7, 1982 hearing. 1 Publicker attempted
to shield certain portions of the transcript by filing a motion for
order respecting confidentiality." In an order dated January 6,
1983, the district court granted the Publicker motion. 13 On the
5. Id. at 1063. A reporter for the Wall Street Journal entered the courtroom subsequent to the removal of the Inquirer reporter and demanded a hearing with counsel for the
newspaper present to determine the reasons for closing the hearing. Counsel for both
newpapers then argued that the proceedings be opened, or, in the alternative, that only the
confidential portions of the hearing be closed. Id.
6. Id. The issue before the district court concerned a motion for preliminary injunction by Cohen requesting the postponement of the December 8, 1982 stockholders' meeting
until Publicker disclosed the confidential information regarding the enzyme to its stockholders. Id.
7. Id. The court explained its position by noting that the very nature of the case
revolved around the disclosure of the confidential information. If the information were to be
disclosed the press would be making the decision before the court had an opportunity to
evaluate the case. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1064. A disgruntled member of the Neuman family had brought a complaint
in the Orphans Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, subsequent to the Cohen-Neuman agreement. The action alleged that the agreement
was in contravention of a Pennsylvania law barring any corporate shareholder from selling
his voting rights or his proxy. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1504 (Purdon 1983). The Delaware County Court set aside the stock purchase agreement due to its lack of legal foundation. Id. at 1062.
10. Id. at 1064.
11. Id.
12. Id. Included in the Publicker motion was a schedule which listed those parts of the
December 7, 1982 transcript that were considered non-confidential. Id.
13. Id. Under the order the attorneys for the two newspapers were allowed possession
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same day, the district court also ordered Publicker to forward to
PNI and Dow Jones those sections of the transcript deemed nonconfidential, but denied the motion for immediate access to the
transcript in all other respects. 14 The newspapers subsequently appealed the district court orders of December 7, 1982 and January
6, 1983.11 In the interim, Publicker moved to dismiss the case on
grounds of mootness.'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court, ruling that the first amendment secured to the press and
public a right of access to civil proceedings. 17 Judge Higginbotham,
delivering the majority opinion,' 8 utilized the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" test' 9 to resolve the question of mootness.
In recognizing the potential for the recurrence of the exclusion of
the public and press from hearings,20 Judge Higginbotham denied
the Publicker motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds of
mootness. 2 '
In addressing the merits of the appeal, Judge Higginbotham first
held that the newspapers possessed a traditional common law right
of access to civil trials.22 While noting that the right of common
law access had been more thoroughly established in criminal trial
proceedings, 23 Judge Higginbotham asserted that the right of pubof the confidential information, but were prohibited by the court from disclosing it to PNI
and Dow Jones. Id.
14. Id. In issuing the order, the district court failed to issue an opinion explaining its
decision. In effect, the confidential information remained undisclosed with no explanation
justifying its nondisclosure. Id.
15. Id. PNI and Dow Jones contended that the two orders violated their common law
and first amendment rights of access to a civil trial and the transcript of such trial. Id.
16. Id. Publicker supported its motion to dismiss by revealing that approval for the
introduction of the controversial enzyme had been given by the British Government. Id.
17. Id. at 1061.
18. Id. Judge Higginbotham was joined by Judges Weis and Sloviter.
19. Id. at 1065. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
"[T]wo conditions must be met to satisfy the test: (1) The challenged action must be too
short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation, and (2) there must be a reasonable expectation that the subjected party will endure the same action again." 733 F.2d at 1065 (citations
omitted).
20. 733 F.2d at 1066. The court speculated that newspaper publishers such as PNI and
Dow Jones could be restrained in the future from access to hearings to decide whether potentially injurious business matters should be kept secret. Id. See Brown and Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
21. 733 F.2d at 1066.
22. Id. at 1066-67.
23. Id. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-69 (1980). The
court in Richmond Newspapers held that a trial courtroom is a public place where the public and press alike have a right of access, and that the right to attend criminal trials is
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lic access was equally established in civil trials.24 In support of this
assertion, Judge Higginbotham pointed out that the first amendment guaranteed a right of access to the public and press to criminal proceedings. The judge noted that in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia25 Chief Justice Burger had asserted that the principal aim of the first amendment is to guarantee uninhibited communication regarding governmental functions. 26 The Chief Justice
had also indicated that the first amendment guarantee of assembly
protected the right of access to places normally designated as open
to the public. A trial courtroom, the Richmond Newspapers
Court concluded, had traditionally been viewed as a public place,
thus open to the public and press.28
Judge Higginbotham then engaged in an examination of English
and American legal authorities to ascertain whether a corresponding presumption of access to a civil trial was supported.2 The inquiry into English legal authorities included legal scholars such as
Coke,3 0 Hale3 1 and Blackstone. 2 These noted authorities, Judge
Higginbotham indicated, supported the presumptive openness of a
implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment. Id.
24. 733 F.2d at 1066 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979)).
The Court noted that in Gannett the Supreme Court acknowledged that historical evidence
supporting a public trial is equally applicable to civil as well as criminal trials. Id.
25. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
26. 733 F.2d at 1068 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604
(1982)). The Court in Globe held that the first amendment right of access to trials is predicated on the premise that the first amendment was designed to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs. Id.
27. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577-78. See 733 F.2d at 1067. The presence of
the public and press at a civil trial was held to safeguard the integrity of the trial. Id. at
1068. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05. This right of access will ensure that the
constitutionally protected discussion of governmental affairs is an informed one.
28. 448 U.S. at 578. The Chief Justice indicated in Richmond, however, that the issue
of the right of access to a civil trial had not been raised. Id. See also Globe Newspapers, 457
U.S. at 611, where the court indicated that its decision concerning access to criminal trials
carried no implications to civil proceedings.
29. 733 F.2d at 1068-71.
30. Id. Coke noted that the Statute of Marlborough of 1267 required court proceedings to be held in public. See 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103 (6th ed.
1681) ("all causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the Judges of the
King's Courts openly in the King's Courts."). Id.
31. 733 F.2d at 1068. Hale observed that the evidence in both criminal and civil trials
under English common law, was disclosed in public. See M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF ENGLAND

163 (C. Gray ed. 1971).

32. 733 F.2d at 1069. Blackstone pointed out that "one of the most conspicuous features of English justice is that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the public

have free access." See 3 W. BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

373.
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civil trial.3 3 In an examination of American legal authorities, the
judge pointed out that the New Jersey and Pennsylvania Constitutions, 34 Holmes3 5 and numerous other authorities s6 supported the
idea of free public access to civil trials.37
Based on this significant judicial history, Judge Higginbotham
ruled that the right of access by the press and public to a civil
proceeding was protected by the first amendment. 38 He further observed that the right of access to a civil trial provides an invaluable
safeguard to the quality and integrity of the judicial process 39 and
allows the public to act as a check on the judicial system by guaranteeing that its prominent role in the participation and discussion
of governmental affairs remains unrepressed.' ° Judge Higginbotham noted, however, that the presumption of openness and the
right of access to civil trials was not absolute, 4 1 explaining that
when an important countervailing interest is presented by the
party opposing access and there exists no less restrictive alternative, public access will be limited.' 2 With respect to such countervailing interests, the court pointed out that a trial court must satisfy specific procedural and substantive demands prior to denying
access to a civil proceeding.' 3
With respect to the requisite procedural requirements, Judge
33. 733 F.2d at 1069.
34. Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 567). The early New Jersey and
Pennsylvania constitutions permitted public access to civil or criminal trials.
35. 733 F.2d at 1069. In Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884), Holmes declared public access to civil trials to be of "vast importance" due to the security given to the
proper administration of justice by the admittance of the public.
36. 733 F.2d at 1069-70. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, p. 435 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1976) (Public proceedings provide the means by which trustworthiness is achieved).
37. 733 F.2d at 1069-70.
38. 733 F.2d at 1070.
39. Id. The court noted that a civil trial "plays a particularly significant role in the
functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole." Id. (quoting Globe
Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606).
40. Id. The court held that public access to civil trials "fosters an appearance of fairness, and heightens public respect for the judicial process." Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper
Co., 457 U.S. at 606).
41. 733 F.2d at 1070. Despite the lack of absoluteness in the right of access to civil
trials, according to Judge Higginbotham this right was to be accorded the same degree of
due process protection that other fundamental rights enjoy. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S.
at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581; Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724
F.2d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d
1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983).

42. 733 F.2d at 1070 (citing Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 606-07; Brown and Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179).
43. 733 F.2d at 1071.
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Higginbotham ruled that a trial court must both specify the countervailing interest to be protected and make conclusions definite
enough to enable a reviewing court to decide whether the closure
order was appropriate.' The court determined that the district
court had defined and articulated the involved countervailing interest very clearly with respect to the motion for the disclosure of
certain confidential information. 5 Thus, the exclusion of the public from the segment of the hearing that concerned this confidential information was deemed proper.'6
The district court was held to have failed, however, to meet the
procedural requirements with regard to Publicker's motion for preliminary injunction, which had been considered in the same closed
hearing and had attempted to prevent Cohen from soliciting and
voting proxies at the stockholders' meeting.' 7 The district court,
Judge Higginbotham stated, had neglected to provide any explanation as to why the hearing was closed with regard to the Publicker
motion.'" The judge noted further that the district court order denying newspaper access to the sealed transcript was issued without
explanation.'9 Judge Higginbotham then held that the failure to
explain these orders constituted both an abuse of discretion by the
district court,50 and a failure to satisfy the designated procedural
requirements. 1
The court, continuing its examination of countervailing interests,
stated that a trial court must also meet certain substantive re44. Id. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984);
In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1983). If the trial
court limits the right of access, Judge Higginbotham stated, the reviewing court can reverse
if the lower court abuses its discretion. 733 F.2d at 1071.
45. 733 F.2d at 1071. The district court was held to have delineated a sufficient interest by pointing out that to permit press access to the hearing. would usurp the judicial function in deciding a case. Id.
46. Id. at 1072.
47. Id.
48. Id. The district court, Judge Higginbotham maintained, articulated no countervailing interests or alternatives, and thus abused its discretion by failing to close that portion of the hearing without an explanation. Id.
49. Id. The district court under Publicker is required to make "findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered." Id. (quoting Press Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 (1984)).
50. 733 F.2d at 1073. The court held that without proper explanation by the district
court, it was left to engage in speculation, which it characterized as judicially unacceptable,
because the reviewing court cannot assume that the lower court's conclusions were based on
a valid rationale. Id.
51. Id. The court held that the record did not provide a solid base for an appellate
review of the exercise of discretion by the district court.
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quirements in denying public access to a hearing.52 The record
must show, Judge Higginbotham maintained, an overriding interest that a closed hearing is necessary to safeguard higher values
53
and is exclusively tailored to serve that purpose.
The court then held that the district court's closing of the hearing extended too far by including Publicker's motion for preliminary injunction, citing the failure of the court to utilize a less restrictive alternative, such as a bifurcated hearing.5 4 This
unwarranted exclusion of the press and public from this aspect of
the hearing, Judge Higginbotham concluded, constituted an abuse
of discretion by the district court.5 5 With respect to the sealing of
the transcripts, the judge continued, the district court had failed to
satisfy procedural requirements and therefore adjudication of the
substantive requirements was held to be unnecessary.5" The court
noted, however, that the presumption of openness and the concern
with protecting investors in Publicker by exposing its questionable
business operations" were not outweighed by the embarrassment
of management and the potential loss of stock value which release
58
of the transcript might engender.
While the court recognized a limit to the first amendment right
of access to civil proceedings, Judge Higginbotham nevertheless
held that the district court, by failing to meet required procedural
and substantive standards, had abused its discretion in denying
PNI and Dow Jones access to the hearing. 9 The court thus reversed the district court's orders of January 6, 1983 and remanded
the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.6 0
Despite being confronted with a case of first impression,6 1 the
Third Circuit decision to extend to press and public alike a first
amendment right of access to civil trials was foreseeable in light of
52. Id. See Press Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824.
53. 733 F.2d at 1073. (quoting United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir.
1981)).
54. 733 F.2d at 1074.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court stated that the confidential information at issue was not usually the
type protected by the courts, such as trade secrets. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Industrial Co. 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Where the matter involved is
poor management, such as in this case, the court will not protect the information. Id.
57. 733 F.2d at 1074. Judge Higginbotham maintained that the court would not deny
access to a civil trial merely because of the bad business practices of one of the litigants.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1071.
60. Id. at 1075.
61. See id. at 1061.
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its reliance on the history of open trials. Publicker can be viewed
as a long awaited affirmation of an existing policy, or as a radical
departure from first amendment guarantees, depending on one's
interpretation of the history of right of access to trials and whether
that right should be properly extended from criminal to civil
proceedings.
The right of the public to attend a trial in the United States is
inexorably linked to our English common law heritage.2 This history reflects the English tradition of recognizing public attendance
at trials as an essential quality of the judicial system. 3 Legal scholars have for centuries praised the openness of the English trial
process."a As early as 1565, English commentators noted the public
character of trials.6 5 Sir Matthew Hale commended the English
system on its practice of presenting all evidence in an open court.66
Blackstone stressed that the open examination of witnesses provided a sure path to truth. 7
The high regard for judicial openness was inherited by the early
American colonies.6 8 Prior to the adoption of the federal constitution,6 9 some colonial charters and early state constitutions explicitly provided for public trials.7 0 A public trial was perceived as essential to the integrity of a judicial proceeding.7 1 Writing in
62. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981). This common law right
of access to judicial proceedings has usually been considered by the Supreme Court in the
criminal trial context. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-69; Gannett, 443
U.S. at 386; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948). See generally D. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S
RIGHT TO KNOW 125-26 (1981) (reviewing English and American common law right of access). See also Kelly, Richmond Newspapers and the First Amendment Right of Access, 18
AKRON L. REV. 33, 41-42 (1984) (discussing historical openness of trials and relation thereof
to right to government information).
63. See 1 J. BENTHAM,RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524, 584-85 (1827); 2 E. COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-45 (6th ed. 1681); E. JENKS,THE BOOK OF ENGLISH
LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967).
64.

See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.

65.

Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 383 (1931). See T. SMITH, DE
79 (L. Alston ed. 1906).
66. Id. M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (C. Gray ed. 1971).
67. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373. Blackstone also noted that the civil law, as
then modeled, rejected all public examination of witnesses. Id.
68. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971).
REPUBLICA ANGLORUM

69. The sixth amendment grants the accused a right to a public trial. Justice Story
noted that the sixth amendment did not affect the common law tradition of public trials,
concluding that a "trial is always public." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

662 (1833).

70. The New Jersey Constitution (1677) provided that any person could attend a trial
whether it was civil or criminal. The Pennsylvania Constitution (1776) provided that all
trials were to be open. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 271.
71. 1 J. BENTHAM,RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827) ("'without publicity, all
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support of open government, James Madison stressed that a system of self-government assumes the existence of an informed citizenry. 71 The common law right of access to trials, developed in
England and nurtured in colonial America, neglected to distinguish
between a civil and criminal trial. 3 Thus, by tradition, both criminal and civil proceedings have been presumptively open. 4 Despite
this long history of implicit support for a public right of access to
judicial proceedings, however, courts have been quite hesitant in
extending constitutional protection to this right. 5
Without constitutional protection of a right of access, courts
have excluded the press and public to protect confidential government information" and trade secrets, 7 and to shield minors and
victims of sex crimes.78 In holding that there exists no constitutional guarantees relating to right of access, courts have utilized
the sixth amendment as a rationale for the exclusion of the pubother checks are insufficient."). See also Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884), where
Justice Holmes noted: "those who administer justice should always act under the sense of
public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own
eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed." Id. at 394.
72. 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) ("A popular government
without information, or means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce . . .knowledge
will forever sovern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm
themselves witih the power which knowledge gives."). Although Madison's remarks refer to
the federal government, this statement is equally applicable to an effective judicial system.
73. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. Whether this failure to distinguish
was intentional or an oversight cannot be accurately deduced.
74. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17. Chief Justice Burger indicated that
historically both civil and criminal trials possessed a presumption of openness. The openness of civil trials remained a presumption until Publicker extended first amendment protection to it. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
75. The judicial reluctance to grant any constitutional protection to the right of access
stems from the lack of a specific constitutional provision guranteeing that right. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379.
76. See e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1279 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (temporary exclusion from trial justified to protect the identity
of an undercover agent); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.'
991 (1972) (public excluded during discussion of skyjacker profile); United States ex rel.
Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970) (exclusion of
public to insure full and honest testimony by government witnesses).
77. Stamicarbon v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 1974) (trade
secrets were formulae for producing adhesives and coatings for certain plastic products);
Zenith Radio v. Matsushita Elec. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (no first amendment right to public inspection and copying of public records).
78. See Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951) (entire rape trial closed in
case involving minor victim); Beise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958) (partial
exclusion in rape case involving minors); Harris v. Stephans, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967) (exclusion of spectators during the testimony of rape victim is a frequent and accepted practice).
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lic. 79 The sixth amendment right of a public trial was held to be
personal to the accused in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,0 in which
it was held that no mention of an independent constitutional right
of access to a trial on the part of the public exists in the

Constitution. 8
The United States Supreme Court has also utilized the litigant's
constitutional right to a fair trial to overcome the societal interest
in an open trial.8 2 The struggle for a constitutional right of access
to judicial proceedings was dealt another setback in Saxbe v.
Washington, 3 where the court reasoned that first amendment
rights were not being violated where press interviews with prison
inmates were prohibited.84
In a pretrial hearing similar to that in Gannett, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Cianfrani5 held that the
public trial provision of the sixth amendment serves not only to
protect the accused, but also the public's "right to know."" A right
to public trial, the court asserted, opens the processes of government to the citizenry and establishes confidence in the judicial system. As evident in the conflicting opinions in Gannett and Cian79. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The Oliver court stressed that the defendant in a
criminal proceeding has, among other rights, the right to summon witnesses, cross examine
and is entitled to a public trial. These rights are guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the sixth amendment. Id. at 266-73. The right to a public trial
was perceived as the right of the litigant, not the right of the public. See infra notes 80-81
and accompanying text.
80. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Justice Stewart, in the majority opinion, noted that the sixth
amendment confers a right to a public trial only to the accused and only in a criminal case.
Id.
81. Id. at 379.
82. Id. at 383. The Gannett Court recognized the presumptive openness of a trial, but
held that this presumption was overcome by the litigant's right to a fair trial. The issue in
Gannett involved the question of right of access to a pretrial proceeding. The Court ruled
that the trial judge had an obligation to minimize prejudicial pretrial publicity in order to
safeguard the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. For other instances in which fair
trial considerations have prevailed over the open trial value, see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See also infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
83. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
84. Id. The court further maintained that the press possesses no constitutional right of
access superior to that of the general public. Id. at 846. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974). Pell dealt with the constitutionality of a regulation prohibiting press interviews with
prison inmates. The court held that newsmen are permitted to talk with inmates whom they
encounter, but a specific interview is a right not enjoyed by the general public. Thus, the
media's first amendment rights are not abridged. Id. at 829-35.
85. 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 853-54 (quoting Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965)).
87. Id. at 853. In a concurring opinion Judge Gibbons recognized that the protection
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frani, the right of the public to attend a trial has swayed between
the historical presumption of openness and the aforementioned
sixth amendment considerations. The Supreme Court settled these
points of controversy in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,"a
holding that the public has a first amendment right of access to
criminal trials.8 9 Since Richmond Newspapers was the primary
precedent relied upon in Publicker, the scope of the former decision should be carefully examined to accurately determine the significance of Publicker.
Chief Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion in Richmond
Newspapers, noted that the first amendment, in guaranteeing freedoms such as speech and press, can be read as protecting the right
of the public to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit
guarantees.90 In recognizing the right to attend criminal trials as
being implicit in the first amendment," the Court pointed out that
other fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, had likewise
to the enjoyment of enumerated
been recognized as indispensable
92
first amendment rights.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that open trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, that jusof a right of access should rest upon a broader constitutional foundation than that afforded

by the sixth amendment. The judge suggested that the right should be based on "the federal
common law implied from the first amendment." Id. at 862. This proposition finds judicial
support in the subsequent Richmond Newspapers and Globe opinions. See infra notes 8892, 95-97 and accompanying text.
88. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Although there was no majority opinion in Richmond, seven
justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the first amendment.
89. Id. at 580. The Richmond Court distinguished Gannett as dealing with a pretrial
proceeding and not an actual trial. Prevalent in the Richmond Newspapers decision is the
heavy reliance on the history of trial openness that was subsequently utilized in Publicker.
Id. at 563-75.
90. 448 U.S. at 576. The Court maintained that the explicitly guaranteed rights to
speak and to publish what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe a trial could be arbitrarily restricted. Id. at 576-77. See also Bridges v. California, 314
It must be
U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("The first amendment does not speak equivocally ....
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a
liberty-loving society will allow").
91. 448 U.S. at 579-80. The court acknowledged that the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials. Without the implicit right to attend such trials, however, important aspects of freedom of speech
and of the press "could be eviscerated." (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681
(1972)).
92. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to interstate travel); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (right of association). These implicit rights, emanating from the first and fourteenth
amendments, receive the same degree of protection as enumerated rights.
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tice is afforded equally, and that confidence in the administration
of justice is maintained. 3 Although the holding in Richmond
Newspapers applies specifically to criminal trials, Justice Stewart
in his concurrence interpreted the first amendment as clearly giving the press and public a right of access to civil as well as criminal
4
trials.'
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to a constitutionally protected right of access to criminal trials in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.'5 The Court held that underlying the
first amendment right of access to criminal trials is the understanding that this amendment was designed to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Thus, by extending first amendment protection to the right of the public to attend a criminal
trial, the discussion of governmental affairs will remain an informed one.
Until the Publicker decision, the question of a first amendment
right of access to civil proceedings was clouded in controversy.
There has been judicial dispute with respect to whether the first
amendment protection afforded to individuals seeking access to
criminal trials also inhered in the civil context.' 8 While no court
prior to Publicker had decisively ruled on whether the first amend93. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at. 592. Public access to court proceedings is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 350. Justice Brennan also noted that the existence of a sixth amendment public trial
right for the accused did not foreclose the existence of the same right in the first amendment to protect the public. Id. See also Comment, Qualified Right of Access to Criminal
Trials Recognized, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 272, 284 (1981).
94. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's
concurrence was the sole opinion in Richmond advocating a constitutional right of access to
civil trials. Stewart relied on Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (right to speak
implies a right to listen) and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (right to publish
implies a freedom to gather information), as authority for his proposition. See 448 U.S. at
599.
95. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
96. Id. at 604. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (state statute prohibiting the press from publishing an editorial on election day held to violate the first and fourteenth amendments).
97. 457 U.S. at 605.
98. Evidence of this controversy is seen in the Globe and Cianfrani opinions. Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Globe asserted that the Court's decision carried no
implications outside the context of criminal trials. Globe, 457 U.S. at 611 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In his concurring opinion in Cianfrani, however, Judge Gibbons made the
statement that the "judicial process, civil and criminal, is presumptively in the public domain." Cianfrani,573 F.2d at 862 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
For further discussion of Publicker, see Comment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 159 (1985) (extensive
discussion of procedural requisites).
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ment protected a right of the public to attend a civil trial, the issue
had been broached earlier in hybrid situations. In two separate instances, courts have held that the press and public alike enjoy a
right to attend a contempt proceeding" and a judicial board
hearing. 100
Advocates of civil trial openness have argued that all trials
should be open since they are a part of the democratic political
process. 10 1 The argument advanced is that an open civil proceeding
would benefit the public in the same way as an open criminal
trial;10 2 openness deters perjury and misconduct on the part of the
participants and permits the public to see how its trust is being
discharged.10 3 Detractors, in turn, have pointed out that public
tri04
als were designed for the protection of criminal defendants.1
In its decision to extend the first amendment right of access to
civil trials, the Publicker court relied on the historical presumption
of open trials, following the reasoning, discussed above, that many
attributes of the criminal system also exist in the civil system. 10 5
99. In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658 (1983). Iowa Council
involved the denial of a motion brought by representatives of the press to release the transcript of a contempt proceeding which contained confidential trade secrets. Noting that
there existed no reasonable alternative to closure, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that due to the potential damage to the manufacturer's property
rights by the disclosure of the trade secrets, the closing of the hearing was justified. Despite
this ruling, the court also held that the public enjoys a first amendment right of access to a
contempt proceeding, a hybrid action containing both civil and criminal characteristics. The
court, relying on Richmond Newspapers and Globe, maintained that the first amendment
right of access to criminal trials clearly supported an application of this principle to contempt proceedings. Id. at 661.
100. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). See also First
Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, 579 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa.
1984). First Amendment Coalition concerned a newspaper challenge to the confidentiality
procedures utilized by the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. The court relied on Richmond Newspapers and the rationale that an open proceeding promotes integrity
and fairness. In accordance with this reasoning, the court held that the proceedings of the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board related to matters of public concern so that first amendment protections are applicable to the Board's procedures. Id. at 212-13. See also Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1983, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 417 (1984) (discussion of First Amendment Coalition follows note on Pennsylvania Supreme Court treatment of similar issue).
101. See Cianfrani,573 F.2d at 862.
102. See Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers
and Beyond, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 415, 432 (1981).
103. Id. The Richmond Newspapers Court also noted that a public trial provides educational and therapeutic value, thus promoting public respect and confidence in the law. 448
U.S. at 570.
104. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 387.
105. 733 F.2d at 1070. "The civil trial like the criminal trial 'plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and government as a whole.' " Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)).
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While under Publicker this right is afforded the due process protection that other fundamental rights enjoy, the court acknowledged that it is not an absolute right and can be limited when an
important countervailing interest is demonstrated." 6
The Publicker court seems to take a logical step in extending
this implicit first amendment right by relying on the historical
evolution of public trials.1 07 The implications of this decision, however, are significant and require an examination of the justification
of the extension from criminal trials to civil trials.
Aside from relying on historical authority in the formulation of
its decision, the Publicker court reasoned that the civil justice system is endowed with many of the characteristics inherent in the
criminal justice system. 0 8s Accordingly, the first amendment right
of access should extend to civil trials.10 9 If the former contention is
taken as true, it becomes clear that as well as playing a significant
role in the judicial process, the right of the press and public to
attend civil trials must be tempered by the litigant's right to a fair
trial." 0
In two celebrated cases dealing with this issue, it was held that a
litigant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial is pivotal in deter106. Id. See also Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984). Under
Publicker, proceedings may be closed if the trial court articulates the countervailing interest
sought to be protected and makes findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine if the closure order was properly entered. Additionally, the trial court must demonstrate an overriding interest that closure is essential and necessary to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Publickercourt noted that the trial court
failed to make findings specific enough for an appellate court to review. Despite this failure,
the court noted that the sensitive information at issue was not the type usually given protection. 733 F.2d at 1074. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co.,
529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (closure upheld for commercial trade secrets); Crystal
Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1980) (closure upheld for attorney-client
relationship). An illustration of the ra.rity of closure orders is documented in Blasi, The

Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.

FOUNDATION RESEARCH

J. 521: "At a

minimum, restrictions on press coverage of official activities should be upheld only if it can
be shown that the restrictions substantially promote an important governmental objective."
d. at 609-10 (quoting from First Amend. Coalition, 579 F. Supp. at 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984)).
107. 733 F.2d at 1070. See Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions:
The First Amendment as Sword, 1980 S. CT. REV. 1, 20 ("The same rule [as that established
in Richmond Newspapers] will almost certainly apply in civil cases. Mr. Justice Stewart
said flatly in Richmond that there is a First Amendment Right of Access to civil as well as
criminal trials and it is hard to see a distinctionin reason or history." (footnotes omitted,
emphasis added)).
108. 733 F.2d at 1070.
109. Id. As discussed above, the Publicker court maintained that a presumption of
openness inheres in both civil and criminal trials. Id.
110. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383. See also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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mining the public's right of access.' 1 In Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that both the first and sixth amendments recognize that the life or liberty of any individual should not be put in
jeopardy by the actions of the news media."' In Sheppard v. Maxwell, a subsequent case, it was held that freedom of discussion
should be given a wide range of latitude, but not at the expense of
a fair trial."3 Thus, just as in a criminal trial, if the presence of the
press or public jeopardizes the litigant's right to a fair trial in a
civil proceeding, closure should be justified.
In assessing whether a right to attend criminal trials extends to
civil litigation, it should be noted that the Richmond Newspapers
Court based its decision on the first, rather than the sixth amendment."14 The Court could have narrowed its holding by broadly interpreting the public trial clause of the sixth amendment, but
chose instead to utilize the first amendment as authority for its
decision. By emphasizing the first amendment rather than the
criminally-oriented sixth amendment, the Supreme Court may
have purposefully left room for future extension of the right of access to civil trials. ' 5 Publicker is evidence of this implicit rationale, since the Third Circuit could not have granted the right of
access to civil trials based on Richmond Newspapers had the Richmond Newspapers Court, in formulating its decision, relied on the
sixth amendment.
The most vigorous objection to extending the right of the public
to civil trials is the assertion that the public need for access to a
civil trial is not as great as in a criminal setting. This argument has
merit when the nature of a civil and criminal proceeding are examined. Civil trials are between private parties engaged in a dispute where usually only the interests of the parties are affected.
111. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
112. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540. The atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial
must be maintained at all costs. Id.
113. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350-51.
114. This reliance on implicitly guaranteed first amendment rights is a major distinction between the Richmond Newspapers and Gannett decisions. By relying on the first
amendment, Richmond Newspapers strayed from the personal right orientation of the sixth
amendment and embraced the more public oriented protection prevalent in the first amendment. This reasoning makes the right of access extension to civil trials a public rather than
a private interest.
115. This implicit reasoning is prevalent in Richmond Newspapers. The first amendment clearly gives the press and public a right of access to criminal and civil trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 599 (Justice Stewart concurring): "Historically both civil and
criminal trials have been presumptively open." Id. at 580 n.17 (Burger, C.J.) (plurality
opinion).
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Thus, the functioning of the judicial process in a civil case is often
of no significance to anyone other than the litigants. A criminal
trial, on the other hand, represents an attempt to resolve a violation of the community; public right of access to such a proceeding
is clearly needed to assure that the court performs its duties with
integrity and fairness.
While the validity of the above argument is clear, it cannot be
categorically stated that a civil trial is less important than a criminal trial. The access right is that of the public and, therefore, the
interest to be gauged is that of the public. And, rather clearly, the
public's interest in a civil trial may often be greater than the defendant's interest in a criminal proceeding.11 A civil trial has the
potential to affect virtually every right of the public, including the
public's property, family and speech rights and its rights to the
free exercise of religion and to integrate public services. 117 Certainly in civil proceedings addressing important issues the public's
interest in a right of access is as compelling as that in a criminal
trial.
Today, the press acts as the vehicle by which the public can
"view" a trial; thus the implications of the Publicker decision are
significant. The public is now afforded the constitutional right to
attend a trial of any nature-civil or criminal. In short, an otherwise private dispute is now potentially "public property."1 18 The
specific nature of each civil action should, of course, ultimately
govern the public right of access: certainly a suit alleging a deadly
design defect serves the public interest far more than the unnecessary public scrutinization of a divorce proceeding. In order to safeguard the interests of the public and to insure the integrity of the
judicial system, a right of access to civil trials should have constitutional protection. This right, however, must be tempered by the
litigant's right to a fair trial and the nature of the civil proceeding
116. Fenner & Koley, supra note 102, at 432. From the public's standpoint, it is more
probable that the multimillion dollar civil suit is more important than the thirty days or
thirty dollars criminal case. Id. Similarly, a shareholders' derivative suit, affecting the interests of investors, directors and officers in a corporation, surely demands the same public
scrutiny usually reserved for criminal trials.
117. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984) (private college whose
students received basic educational opportunity grants subject to statute prohibiting sex
discrimination in any federally assisted program); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (segregation of students in public schools solely on basis of race pursuant to state
laws so permitting violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
118. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). In Craig,Justice Douglas used the
term "public property" to characterize "[w]hat transpires in the courtroom" during the
course of a trial. Id. See O'BRIEN, supra note 62, at 127.
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itself. As the decision indicates, the Publicker court has succeeded
in achieving the delicate balance between the paramount right to a
fair trial and the right of the press and public alike to attend a
civil proceeding.
Dan M. Brookhart

